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STATKMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This is an appeal of an Industrial Commission's Order Denying Reconsideration. The 
Claimant contends that she is entitled to ongoing medical care, temporary partial/and or 
temporary total disability (TPD/TTD) benefits, and total permanent disability (PPD) benefits. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition: 
The Claimant (Ms. Shubert) was employee at Macy's department store at the Boise Town 
Square Mall location. She had worked there since 2002. On May 1, 2006 the Claimant was 
injured in a work-related fall. (Tr., p.27, L. 11-25; p.28, L.1-25).The Claimant received medical 
treatment thru workman's compensation from August 31, 2006 thru November 21, 2007. 
On November 21, 2007, workman's compensation's physician Dr. Nancy Greenwald 
M.D. told the Claimant when she came in for her scheduled appointment that she had reached 
her maximum medical improvement (MMI) even though the Claimant discussed and filled out a 
report for Dr. Greenwald of the serious ongoing medical issues she was still having as a result of 
the work-related injury. (Def. Ex. G, p.86)(a). Dr. Greenwald assessed a PPI of 5% of the whole 
person and released the Claimant from her care. 
The Claimant called Dr. Greenwald' s office to ask if she could get additional medical 
help. Dr. Greenwald's assistant Valerie told the Claimant, "No, you cannot come back." ( Tr., p. 
41, L. 21-25 ). 
On June 22, 2009, the Claimant filed a workman's compensation complaint ( R., p.1-2 ). 
On November 13, 2012 there was a hearing with the Industrial Commission's Referee Michael 
E. Powers and the Defendant's attorney Mr. Kent W. Day. (Tr., Vol. I). An Order was issued 
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from the Industrial Commission on June 19, 2013 with their recommendations and approval of 
Referee Power's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation. ( R., p. 6 ). 
The Claimant filed a motion for reconsideration of the Commission's Order on July 9, 
2013. ( R., p. 27-28 ). The Claimant contended that she was entitled to a permanent partial 
disability rating exceeding 10%; reimbursement of prior out-of pocket personal paid medical 
expenses related to her work-related injury; that she was entitled to a permanent on-going 
monthly income because of her chronic pain since her work related injury; that she was not MMI 
on or after November 21, 2007; that she was entitled to additional medical benefits beyond the 
MMI date; and that she was entitled to ongoing disability benefits. ( R., p. 31-32 ). 
The Commission denied the request in an Order Denying Reconsideration on August 16, 
2013. ( R., p. 38 ). The Claimant then respectfully exercised her right to make an appeal of the 
Commission's Order Denying Reconsideration to the Idaho Supreme Court on September 26, 
2013. ( R., p.43 ). The Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court was dated on October 18, 
2013. 
III. Concise Statement of Facts: 
The Claimant was 57 years old at the time of hearing before Referee Powers of the 
Industrial Commission. She began working for Macy's department store at the Boise Town 
Square Mall in 2002. She was a sales associate in the women's department and her duties 
included filling in at various department locations as needed. 
On May 1, 2006, the Claimant was assigned to work in the Woman's World department. 
When she went up there they ( other work associates) were telling her "Watch out for the mat, it's 
got holes in it, everybody is tripping on it and so all day, and then I close by myself, you know, I 
tripped a few times." ( Tr., p.27, L.16-23) 
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After the store closes at 9:00 pm, the lights begin to automatically shut down. The 
Claimant was wrapping up her duties and it was getting dark back in there when she came back 
to get her purse and came around the comer and tipped on the mat with the holes and fell with 
her leg bent. ( Tr., p.28, L. 1-25 ). She felt pain immediately and finally was able to get up and 
clocked out and went home. The work-related injury was reported the next day to a supervisor, 
but nobody followed up with her so on May 16, 2006, the Claimant asked a manager if the 
accident had been reported. The Claimant was told to fill out an incident report, and she did so. 
The Claimant did not immediately seek treatment for her work-related injury because a 
manager told her that such treatment probably would not be covered. ( Tr., p. 30 L. 1-25 ). After 
about three months the Claimant was not getting any better and she was told to go to Primary 
Health where she saw Cory Huffine, N.P. and was diagnosed with a low back strain and left hip 
pain. Mr. Hufffine prescribed anti-inflammatory medication, but the Claimant told Mr. Huffine 
she could not take that medication because it would cause her urinary tract infection. ( R., p. 9-
10 ). The Claimant was referred to the occupational medicine department. ( R., p. 10, par. 9, L. 1-
2 ). 
On September 6, 2006, the Claimant was examined by Dr. Scott Lossman, M.D. at 
Primary Health's occupation medicine department. His report stated the Claimant's chief 
complaint was left side pain. Dr. Lossman opined that she had low back strain with sacroiliitis on 
the left and left leg sciatic. He further stated, "Of note #1 and #2 are reasonably medically work-
related." (Cl.Ex. F /Dr.Lossman/ 09/06/2006, p. 2 ). The Claimant had appointments with Dr. 
Lossman on October 11, 2006 and October 19, 2006 where he again noted the Claimants on-
going left hip and low back pain as high as 10/10. Dr. Lossman also noted that the Claimant 
thinks physical therapy is actually making it worse-not better. Dr. Lossman noted that she is 
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still working ... she says her work wants her to work more hours, but she does not want to, does 
not feel that she can." He opined on both examinations dates that "this injury is reasonably and 
medically work related." ( Cl. Ex. FI Dr. Lossman / 10/11/2006, p.1/; 10/19/2006 p. l ). 
The Claimant was referred to physical therapy by Dr. Lossman. The Claimant's 
evaluation by Raj Issure of The Athletic Training Center stated that the patient reported that 
bending and sitting for prolonged periods of time increased her pain in the left hip and sacroiliac 
joint areas ... that the patient was guarded in the low back and moved slowly during transfer 
from sitting to standing ... ( Def. Ex. H, p.87 ). The Claimant went four times to physical therapy 
from September 22, 2006 thru October 3, 2006. (Def.Ex. H, p. 88-91 ). Dr. Lossman stopped 
physical therapy because of the Claimant's pain and ordered an MRI appointment for the 
Claimant. 
The Claimant on October 25, 2006 met with Dr. Diane Newton, M.D. /Advanced Open 
Imaging. Dr. Newton's MRI findings noted an L4-5 minimal annulus bulge ... with an annular 
tear. ( Cl. Ex. F I Advanced Open Imagining/ 10/25/06, p.1-2 ). 
On November 02, 2006 the Claimant was examined again by Dr. Lossman where he 
again noted the Claimant's chief complaint as low back strain and sacroiliitis. He further noted 
that she says she feels worse some days and certainly does not feel better and that she has 
burning pain, feeling like a hot poker on the left lateral. .. The MRI showed an L4-L5 annular 
disk tear. Pain 8/10. Again Dr. Lossman stated "this injury is reasonably medically work-
related." ( CL Ex.FI Dr. Lossman / 11/02/2006. p.1 ). 
Upon a referral from Dr. Lossman, the Claimant was evaluated by Dr. Greenwald 
M.D. on December 11, 2006. Dr. Greenwald refused to provide her with a permission slip to 
miss work despite the Claimant's severe pain. Dr. Greenwald did give the Claimant lifting 
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restrictions. Dr. Greenwald ordered an EMG and suggested epidural injections into the SI joint. 
The Claimant didn't want to do the injections because her sister and mother had experienced bad 
side effects from receiving such injections. ( R., p. 11 12 ). 
The Claimant continued to meet with Dr. Greenwald. The Claimant had been going to 
physical therapy and was using Lidoderm patches. The Claimant was still working at Macy's 
despite the serious pain because Dr. Greenwald would not give her time off work. On April 11, 
2007 (almost a year after the injury), the Claimant continued to express her severe pain issues 
related to her work-related injury to Dr. Greenwald--seeing no improvement she ordered another 
MRI. 
The Claimant met with Dr. Anthony Giaupue, M.D./Intermountain Medical Imaging. 
Another MRI confirmed at the L4-5 there is a broad based disk bulging fissuring and tearing of 
the left foraminal/far lateral annual fibers. (Cl. Ex. F / Imtermountain Medical Imaging/ 
05/24/2007 p.1 ) 
Dr. Greenwald requested an IME. The Claimant on August 9, 2007 met with Dr. Kevin 
Krafft, M.D. Dr. Kraft stated in his independent medical examination report that the Claimant 
denies having any prior difficulties similar to those she is now experiencing since the work-
related injury. The MRI shows an L4-5 annular disc tear and a broad based disc bulge at L4-5 
with fissuring and tearing of the far left annular fibers. The Claimant's chief complaint is pain in 
left leg with burning, cramping, stabbing, pain is reported as constant. Dr. Kraft also stated that 
to "a reasonable degree of medical certainty, there is a causal relationship between examinee's 
current complaints and the reported injury." Dr. Krafft also stated "the examinee (Ms. Shubert) 
has not achieved maximum medical improvement." (Cl.Ex.FI Boise Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation / 08-09-2007/ p.1,4,5,6, 10,11,12 ). 
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Dr. Kraft, in a letter to Marsha Gregory/Liberty Northwest dated August 13, 2007, stated, 
"On a more probable than not basis her (Claimants) current symptoms are likely the result of her 
accident." As to the question "Is the patient's condition fixed and stable?"-Dr. Kraft states, 
"Not as yet." (Cl.Ex.FI Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. /08/13/2007/ p.l). 
In October 2007, the Claimant again met with Dr. Greenwald to discuss Dr. Kraft's 
medical opinions and the Claimant's ongoing medical symptoms in her groin and pain down her 
left leg. Per Dr. Greenwald' s recommendation the Claimant agreed to another round of physical 
therapy with Breda Chow of Hands on Therapy. Dr. Greenwald suggested a trial of Neurontin 
and Claimant agreed to try the prescription. ( R., p. 14 ). 
On November 1, 2007 the Claimant had another appointment with Dr. Greenwald in 
which she complained of her new pain in her buttocks and the continuing pain in her left leg. The 
Claimant had attended physical therapy eight times and Dr. Greenwald agreed to stop physical 
therapy because it was not helping. The Claimant also informed Dr. Greenwald that she had to 
stop taking the Neurontin after about 10 days because it was burning her bladder. Dr. Greenwald 
stopped that prescription and gave the Claimant a prescription for Lyrica. ( R., p. ). 
On November 21, 2007 the Claimant met with Dr. Greenwald for the last time. The 
Claimant in the office report to Dr. Greenwald stated her concern over the ongoing constant pain. 
Dr. Greenwald suggested a diagnostic epidural injection again, but the Claimant declined 
because as stated before her sister and mother had bad experiences and serious side effects with 
that procedure. Dr. Greenwald in this same meeting told the Claimant she had reached her MMI 
and that there was nothing further she could off er in terms of pain relief and released her from 
her care. Dr. Greenwald assessed her a PPI of 5% of the whole person due to the Claimant's 
difficulty with daily activities and work. ( R., p.15 ). 
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The Claimant after being released from workman's comp medical care called Dr. 
Greenwald' s office and asked for additional help. Dr. Greenwald' s assistant, Valerie, said, "No 
you cannot come back." ( Tr., p. 41, L.27-25/ p.42, L.1-3 ). 
The Claimant sought other medical help for her ongoing pain and medical issues 
resulting from her work-related injury. She met with Dr. Roman Schwartsman, M.D. on June 26, 
2008. He noted she has radiating pain down the back of the leg and into the lateral calf and into 
the foot. An MRI shows a broad based disc bulge and fissuring of the lateral annular fibers. The 
pathology is on the left side at L4-5, which correlates with the location of the patient's symptoms 
specifically the weakness and radiation of her pain. Dr. Schwartsman opined that "I do however 
feel that the majority of her symptoms are coming from her lumbar spine specifically the annular 
tear." ( Cl. Ex. F / Dr. Roman Schwartsman /06/26/2008. p.1-2). Dr. Schwartsman 
recommended she see a spine surgeon. 
The Claimant was examined by Dr. Frizzell, M.D., Ph.D. a neurosurgeon on July 31, 
2008. Dr. Frizzell noted that she has had MRI imaging ... she has seen psychiatry and has gone 
thru extensive physical therapy. She has been through several medications as well. She has had 
follow-up imaging studies. She has seen specialist, and an orthopedist as well. Dr. Frizzell 
reported that "It is my medical opinion, on a more probable than not basis, that Ms. Shubert's 
ongoing left-sided low back, left hip and left leg symptoms are related to her fall on May 1, 
2006. I do not believe that Ms. Shubert is at maximum medical improvement at this time." ( Cl. 
Ex. F /Dr.Frizzell/ 07/31/2008 p. 1-.4). 
Dr. Frizzell felt that the Claimant might benefit from a spinal cord stimulator and referred 
her to Dr. Sandra Thompson, M.D. The Claimant did have this surgery where they inserted a 
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metal rod in her back. This surgery did not help with the ongoing pain from her work-related 
injury, but actually "made it worse." ( Tr., p. 47, L. 1-25 ). 
The Claimant because of her ongoing medical issues from her work-related injury filed a 
workman's compensation complaint on June 22, 2009. The Claimant had a hearing before 
Referee Michael E. Powers of the Industrial Commission on November 13, 2012. 
On June 19, 2013, Referee Powers filed his proposed Finding of Fact, Conclusion of 
Law, and Recommendation. Referee Powers stated the Conclusions of Law: 1) Claimant was 
medically stable on and after November 21, 2007 (MMI date); 2) Claimant is not entitled to 
additional medical benefits beyond the MMI date; 3) Claimant is not entitled to temporary 
disability benefits (TTD) or (TPD); 4) Claimant is entitled to a permanent partial impairment 
(PPI) of 5% of whole person; and 5) Claimant is entitled to a permanent disability rating of 10% 
inclusive of her permanent impairment. ( R., p. 23 ). 
The Claimant filed a request for the Commission to reconsider the decision order by 
Referee Powers. On July 9, 2013 this request was submitted to the Commission. She contended 
that because of the seriousness of her ongoing pain and medical problems that she was entitled to 
over and above the permanent partial disability rating of 10%. 
On August 16, 2013, the Commission filed an Order Denying Reconsideration stating 
that the Claimant's request for additional medical care is not supported by the record and that the 
Claimant did not present any evidence from an expert regarding disability in excess of 
impairment. 
The Claimant felt her only legal recourse was to exercise her legal right to appeal to the 
Idaho Supreme Court. The Claimant filed a notice of appeal to the Commission on September 
26, 2013 and a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court on October 18, 2013. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when they did 
not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence submitted 
when they concluded that the Claimant was medically stable on and after November 
21, 2007 (lVIMI date) 
II. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when they did 
not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence submitted 
when they denied the Claimant ongoing medical benefits that are causally related to 
her work-related injury 
III. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused of their discretion when they 
did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence submitted 
when they denied the Claimant total and partial temporary disability benefits 
IV. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when they did 
not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence submitted 
when they failed to conclude that the Claimant should be entitled to total permanent 
disability benefits 
V. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when they did 
not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence submitted 
when they concluded that the Claimant was able to enter the labor market at the 
time of her hearing 
Standard of Appellate Review 
The Claimant is aware of the legal privilege and importance regarding her right to make 
an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
The Claimant is aware that this Court exercises free review over legal conclusions, but 
will not set aside any finding of fact which are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Excell Constrnction, Inc., v State Department of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 116 P 3d 18, (Idaho App, 
2005). This Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the Commission's Order pursuant to 
Article V, Section 9 of the Idaho Constitution; LC. 72-724 and 72-1368(9), and Idaho Appellate 
Rules 4 and 14(b). The Claimant respectfully contents that she does have substantial and 
competent evidence to support her lawful appeal to this Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when they 
did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence 
submitted when they concluded that the Claimant was medically stable on and 
after November 21, 2007 (MMI date) 
If the Commission does not make a correct and proper application of the law in regards to 
the evidence on record, the Court can overturn the erroneous conclusion. Blayney v. City of 
Boise, 110 Idaho 302, 715 P2d 972 ( 1986). 
The Claimant is aware that this Court will not set aside any finding of fact that are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence, but that this Court does review questions of 
fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's 
findings. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88,910 P 2d 759, 760 (1996). The Court's 
definition of substantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind 
might accept to support a conclusion." Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 128 
Idaho 161, 164, 911 P .2d 754, 757 (1996). 
The Claimant contends that the Commission did not make a correct and proper 
application of the law in regards to the evidence submitted at her hearing. The lawful role of the 
Commission is "finder of fact." Idaho Const. Art V section 9. This Courts review is generally 
limited to questions of law. Id. However, if the findings of the Commission are not "supported 
by substantial competent evidence, they are not binding and conclusive" and should be appealed 
for review. Dean v. Dravo Corp., 97 Idaho 158, 161,540 P.2d 1337, 1340 (1975). In such 
instances, the findings of fact will be set aside on appeal. Id. 
The Claimant asserts that the Commission's findings have not met the evidence standard 
legally required by this Court. The Commission in their Order Denying Reconsideration stated 
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that the Claimant did not supply ''any evidence from any expert regarding disability in excess of 
impairment." ( R., p. 40, bottom paragraph). Respectfully this is an erroneous statement by the 
Commission because the Claimant did submit at her hearing Ex. D her Social Security 
Administration claim stating that she is disabled. (Tr., p.14, L.9-14).The Claimant's Exhibit D 
did provide evidence from a medical expert regarding the Claimant's disability in excess of 
impairment. 
It should be noted that Referee Powers excluded this exhibit because "their system in 
determining disability is much different than ours." ( Tr., p. 14, L .9 -12 ). The United States 
Supreme Court has held that an agency "may not use its specialized knowledge as a substitute for 
evidence presented at a hearing." Kyu Son Yi v. State Bd. Of Veterinary Med., 960 A.2d 864, 
870 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008) (citing 42 Am. Jur. Publ. Admin. Law 130.) The Claimant's Exhibit 
D was readmitted back into the Agency Records per the Claimant's Objection to Records. ( R., p. 
54 ). 
The Claimant's issue is not whether their system in determining disability is different that 
the Commissions-it is asserted by the Claimant that the lawful issue is that the Commission 
abused their role as "finder of facts" when they failed to consider the competent and substantial 
evidence that she submitted from an medical expert regarding the her disability in excess of 
impairment. The Claimant submitted this compelling evidence in support of her claim that she 
was not MMI as concluded by the Commission on November 21, 2007. 
It is also contended the Commission failed in their lawful role as "finder of fact" because 
they did not give credibility to expert medical opinion from an "expert who had reviewed all the 
relevant medical records." The standard set by the Court is that the Commission could decide 
'not' to give credibility to an expert where the expert had "failed to review all the relevant 
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medical records." Mazzone v Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 302, p .3d 718 (2013). 
The Court ruling is that the Referee and Commission "must accept as true the positive, 
uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless this testimony is inherently improbable, or 
rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial." Pierstorff v. Gray's 
Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438,447, 72 P 2d 171,175 (1937). 
When reviewed in light of this Court's evidence credibility standard the Claimant's Ex. D 
fulfills this legal standard because Administrative Law Judge Molleur asserted that he had 
"carefully reviewed the entire record." (Cl. Ex. D, p.1). This is substantial and competent 
credible evidence from an expert who states that the Claimant is disabled and that onset of her 
disability was preceded by a work-related injury when she tripped and fell on May 1, 2006. (Cl. 
Ex. D, p.4). 
The Court has again affirmed that the role of the Commission referee is that of a "finder 
of fact" and "not a medical expert and that permitting a referee to exceed his or her role as finder 
of fact underlies the legal purpose of the Industrial Commissions proceedings to accommodate 
Claimants and promote justice in simple proceedings." Hagler, 118 Idaho 599, 798 P.2d 58 
( 1990). The Commission has a lawful responsibility as finder of fact to accommodate claimants 
and promote justice-the Claimant contends that the Commission legally failed in both of these 
roles regarding her appeal. 
Judge John T. Molleur /Administrative Law Judge for the Social Security 
Administration/Office of Disability Adjudication and Review in his decision date March 29, 
2011 stated regarding the Claimant's disability-"fully favorable." Per his statement, "After 
careful review of the 'entire record', the undersigned (Judge Molleur) finds the claimant has 
been disabled from November 25, 2008." (Cl.Ex. D, p. l). Again the concern is not "how" did 
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they determine the Claimant was disabled, but rather that this expert opinion was submitted as 
evidence to support the Claimant's appeal that she was not MMI on or after November 21, 2007. 
Per the Court this evidence has met the requirement in Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 
Idaho 750, 302, p .3d 718 (2013). 
Judge Molleur states in regards to the Claimant's medical condition: 
" ... that the medical records further support the Claimant's allegations of disabling 
impairments. The Claimants onset of disability was preceded by a work-related injury when 
she tripped and fell on May 1, 2006 ... since that time she has complained of radiating pain 
down the back of her leg. Dr. Schwartsman noted that she has annual tears L4-5, which 
correlated with the location of the Claimant's symptoms, specifically the weakness and 
radiation." ( CL Ex. D, p.4 ). He further stated that the Claimant testified that "she worked at 
Macys for seven years and stopped when her pain became too great." ( Cl. Ex. D, p.4 ). 
Judge Molleur further states that: 
"After considering the evidence of record, the undersigned finds that the Claimant's 
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged 
symptoms, and that the Claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 
limiting effects of these symptoms are generally credible. At the hearing, the Claimant 
testified extensively regarding her impairments and limitations. Overall, she described a 
lifestyle significantly limited by pain. She can no longer perform many household chores. 
Those that she can perform, such as laundry, must be done piecemeal." (Cl.Ex. D, p.4 ). 
"She has undergone numerous conservative and invasive treatment modalities. 
Unfortunately, these treatments have not provided relief. Further, in March 2009, she sought 
a consultation with Dr. Frizzell who opined that she was 'not a surgical candidate.' Most 
recently, the Claimant participated in another course of physical therapy, which increased her 
symptoms." ( Cl. Ex. D, p.4 ) 
Respectfully consider also the following competent evidence-- Judge Molleur also stated 
he reviewed a consultative examination by Dr. John Casper, M.D. of the Claimant on June 11, 
2009 and based on his examinations Dr. Casper opined "that the Claimant should not lift or carry 
more than 25 lbs, more significantly, he opined that she would have difficulty in prolonged 
standing and walking due to her low back pain." (CL Ex. D, p.5). 
In reference to other medical records Judge Molleur reviewed, he affirmed that "the 
State agency medical consultant's physical assessments are given little weight because they are 
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inconsistent with the medical record." ( CL Ex. D, p.5 ). This is a significant statement of fact 
from an impartial expert that should have been given important consideration by the Commission 
as "finder of fact." 
The Court does review questions of fact only to determine whether substantial and 
competent evidence supports the Commission's findings. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 
910 P 2d 759, 760 (1996). When that evidence is not lawfully considered then the conclusions 
of fact by the Commission should be reviewed. If the Commission does not make a correct and 
proper application of the law in regards to the evidence on record, this Court can overturn the 
erroneous conclusion. Blayney v. City of Boise, 110 Idaho 302, 715 P 2d 972 (1986). 
The Commission cannot just 'take notice of whatever it likes' --the Court affirms that 
"witnesses are still necessary." Pomerinke, 124 Idaho at 306, 859 P .2d at 342: Hite, 96 Idaho at 
72, 524 P .2d at 533. 
The Claimant wishes to also draw attention to the following evidence offered by the 
Defendants. They erroneous state concerning Dr. Schwartsman' s report dated June 26, 2008, "He 
had 'no explanation' for the Claimant's continued pain complaints and 'only noted' she did have 
pain which corresponded with mild/ moderate arthritic changes seen in the x-rays." (LC.Def. 
Response Brief. p. 8). 
It should be factually noted regarding the Defendant's erroneous statement that in this 
same report, Dr. Schwartsman noted that an MRI of the lunbar spine was reviewed. The MRI 
shows a broad-based disc bulge and fissuring of the lateral annual fibers. The pathology is on the 
left side at L4-5, which correlated with the location of the patient's symptoms specifically the 
weakness and radiation of her pain ... I do feel that the majority of her symptoms are coming 
from her lumbar spine specifically the annular tear. He also states that he thinks the patient (Ms. 
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Shubert) needs to be evaluated by a qualified spine surgeon with regard to L4-5 and L5-S 1. This 
report was dated June 26, 2008 after the Claimant was pronounced MMI by Dr. Greenwald. ( Cl. 
Ex. F. Dr. Schwartsman./ 06/26/2008, p. 1-2). 
Again it is not the intent of the Claimant to "rehash the facts" but in keeping with the 
Courts own standard of review that the Court exercises free review over legal conclusions, but 
will not set aside any finding of fact which are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Idaho Const. Art. V, Section 9; Excell Construction, Inc., v. State Department of Labor, 141 
Idaho 688, 116 P3d 18, (Idaho App, 2005). However, it is of lawful importance to this Court that 
the findings of fact 'are supported' by substantial and competent evidence. The Claimant has just 
provided substantial and competent evidence clearly showing erroneous facts offered by the 
Defense. The contention again is that the Commission's conclusions to the facts are to be legally 
supported by competent and substantial "credible evidence." 
The Claimant respectfully mentions another competent medical expert's opinion 
regarding her MMI status after November 21, 2007. Dr. Roy Frizzell, M.D., Ph.D. stated on July 
31, 2008, "It is my medical opinion, on a more probable than not basis, Ms. Shubert's ongoing 
left-sided low back, left hip, and left leg symptoms are related to her fall on May 1, 2006. I do 
not believe Ms. Shubert is at maximum medical improvement at this time." (Cl.Ex. F, Dr. Roy 
Frizzell. / 07 /31/ 2008 p. 1-4 ). 
This additional expert opinion statement by Dr. Frizzell, M.D., Ph.D. was made after Dr. 
Greenwald said she felt the Claimant was MMI on November 21, 2007. 
The Court affirms that if there are conclusions of fact which are clearly erroneous they 
should be appealed to this Court. Hughes v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 48 P 3d 1238 
(2002). The Court defines substantial and competent evidence as "relevant evidence which a 
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reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho State 
Ins. Fund, 128 Idaho 161,164,911 P .2d 754, 757 (1996). 
The Claimant contents that the Commission does not have "substantial and compelling 
evidence" to support their conclusions. However, the Claimant believes a reasonable mind could 
easily support the conclusion that she was not MMI on November 21, 2007 when considering all 
of the substantial and competent evidence submitted to the Commission by the Claimant. 
The Claimant asks the Court to reconsider both the preponderance of evidence she has 
submitted and its competency. The Claimant in support of this lawful appeal has noted in her 
Claimant's Response Brief where she referenced 11 different doctor reports by 7 different 
doctors that have evaluated the Claimant's work-related injury and concluded she has as an L4-5 
annular disc tear with abroad based disc bulge with fissuring and tearing of the far left annular 
fibers ( LC. Cl. Resp. Brief, p. 11-14 ); 3 different medical experts (Dr. Lossman, Dr. Krafft, and 
Dr. Frizzell) state that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty there is a causal relationship 
between the her symptoms and the reported injury. ( LC. Cl. Opening Brief, p. 4-6); 4 medical 
experts that opined that the majority of her ongoing symptoms are related to her L4-5 injury 
(after the MMI date) ( LC. Cl. Opening Brief, p. 4-5/ CL Ex. D. p. 4-5): a medical expert-- Dr. 
Roy Frizzell, M.D., Ph.D. stated that he does not believe the Claimant was MMI on July 31, 
2008 (after the proposed MMI date) (LC.Cl. Opening Brief, p.6 ); Judge Molleur /an 
administrative law judge determined that the Claimant's onset of disability was preceded by a 
work-related injury when she tripped and fell on May 1, 2006; Judge Molleur stated she is 
'disabled' (post-MMI date) (Cl. Ex. D. p.1 and 4); an impartial vocational expert who testified 
under oath that the demands of the claimant's past relevant work exceed her residual functional 
capacity (Cl. Ex. D, p. 5); and uncontradicted personal witnesses who attest to the Claimant's 
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ongoing medical issues resulting from her work-related injury after the pronounced MMI date. 
The Defendant's have only 'one doctor' (Dr. Greenwald) who felt the Claimant was MMI on 
November 21, 2007. (Cl.Ex. E ). 
The Claimant has just shown where the Defendant's presented erroneous statements in 
regards to medical evaluations of the Claimant's condition from Dr. Schwartsman and Dr. 
Frizzel. This Court has asserted that when "generalities are considered as fact, particularly when 
a factual issue is closely contended, a case should be reconsidered to the fact finder for 
reconsideration of relevant issues without errors." Kele v Steve Henderson Logging, 127 Idaho 
681,905 P2d 82 (Idaho App 1995). 
The Claimant appeals to this Court's standard of review--"that whether the offered 
conclusion can be met by the substantial and competent evidence." Id. Substantial and competent 
evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept in support of the offered 
conclusion. Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 735, 40 P.3d 91, 93 (2002). The 
Claimant has provided substantial medical testimony that supports her appeal that she was not 
MMI on November 21, 2007 to "a reasonable degree of medical probability." Langley v. State 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 P.2d 732 (1995). The Court defines 
"probable as having more evidence for than against." Fisher v. Bunker Hill Company, 96 Idaho 
341. 344,528 P.2d 903,906 (1974). 
The Claimant contents that she was not MMI on November 21, 2007-and that the 
Commission has not met the Court's evidence standard to support their conclusion. Therefore the 
Claimant respectfully appeals to this Court to overturn this erroneous conclusion that she was 
MMI on and after November 21, 2007. 
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II. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when 
they did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence 
submitted when they denied the Claimant ongoing medical benefits that are 
causally related to her work-related injury 
To receive benefits under Idaho workers compensation regime, a claimant must establish 
that he or she suffered an injury as defined by Idaho Code 72-102. Dinius v. Loving Care and 
More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 574, 990 P.2d 738, 740 (1999). As noted per Idaho Code 72-432, "If 
an employer fails to provide the same-the injured employee may do so at the expense of the 
employer." The Claimant has already provided substantial evidence in this Appellate Brief 
before the Court that the "injury for which benefits are claimed is casually related to the work-
related accident." Wichterman v. J.H. Kellley, Inc., 144 Idaho 138, 158, P .3d 301 (2007). 
Idaho Code 72-432(1) protects employees mandating that employers provide necessary 
medical services for employees injured on the job. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Edmondson, 
130 Idaho 108, 111, 937 P.2d 420,423 (1997). The Court also affirms that Idaho Code section 
72-432(1) is not a tool that can be used by an employer or surety to deny benefits-it merely 
ensures that an employer or surety is limited to compensating for only medical treatment related 
to an employee's industrial accident or disease. Fife v. Home Depot, Inc., Idaho at 260, P.3d at 
1184. 
If an employee wishes to be compensated for this treatment, the employee must show that 
the care was reasonable and that it was related to the industrial accident or disease. Henderson, 
142 Idaho at 565, 130 P.3d at 1103. The reasonableness of a required treatment is an analysis 
required by LC. 72-432(1). Hipwell v. Challenger Pallet & Supply, 124 Idaho 294, 298, 859, 
P.2d 330, 334 (1993). Per the Court even though medical care is reasonable, it is still not 
compensable unless the care was" due to the industrial accident." Henderson, 142 Idaho at 565, 
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130 P.3d 1097, 1103. The Claimant's ongoing pain and impairments therefore should be 
compensable because they are causally connected to her industrial accident on May 1, 2006. 
Per the lawful requirement of this Court-if the Commission's findings are not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence, they are not binding and conclusive. Dean v. 
Dravo Corp., 97 Idaho 158, 161, 540 P.2d 1337, 1340 (1975).The Claimant contends that the 
conclusions of Referee Powers in Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation 
and of that of the Commission in their Order Denying Reconsideration are not based upon the 
Courts required evidence standard and that she is legally entitled to ongoing medical. 
Also the Claimant would like to note that the Defendant's assert that they are not 
responsible for payment for medical charges after the Claimant's MMI date; however, let it be 
noted that "if the employer fails to provide the same, the injured employee may do so at the 
expense of the employer." LC. 72-432. 
The Defendants falsely assert that "authorization for care from surety was never 
requested for subsequent physicians." ( Def. Response Brief, p.14 top). 
Per a letter, dated January 15, 2008, from Marsha Gregory/Liberty Northwest to Stephen 
Stark ( attorney for Claimant at the time of the letter) she stated, "At this point, I will not 
authorize a second opinion with an orthopedic physician." (Def.Ex. J, p. 121). Again note this 
was after the proposed MMI date. 
First consider the fact that "she did seek additional help from surety after the MMI date 
of November 21, 2007." The Claimant did call Dr. Greenwald's office for additional help and 
was denied. ( Tr., p. 41, L. 21-25 ). This denial for additional medical care for her ongoing work-
related injury was before the Claimant met with Dr. Schwartsman on June 28, 2008. Obviously 
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these are erroneous assertions made by the Defendants because the Claimant did contact surety 
and was denied additional medical help and was also denied a referral to another physician. 
When erroneous evidence is considered particularly when a factual issue is closely 
contended, a case should be remanded to the fact finder for reconsideration of relevant issues 
without errors. Kele v. Steve Henderson Logging, 127 Idaho 681,905 P 2d 82 (Idaho App 1995). 
The Claimant asserts that these were erroneous facts offered by the Defendants and that the 
Commission needs to reconsider their erroneous conclusion to the evidence submitted. 
In the Order Denying Reconsideration , the Commission stated that "as to the Claimant's 
request for additional medical care, the record supports that the Claimant did not benefit from 
additional treatment, and that 'none' of her treating physicians referred her for additional 
treatment post MMI date." ( R., p. 39, L. 1-4 ). The Claimant would like to respectfully content 
with this erroneous statement. 
The Commission stated that "the records of Dr. Frizzell submitted by the Claimant do not 
provide a well-reasoned analysis that connects the Claimant's accident to a specific injury and 
this specific injury to her pain, nor any medical rationale justifying his recommendation in light 
of the Claimant's history. At best, Dr. Frizzell's statement causally connecting the Claimant's 
complaints to the industrial accident is incomplete in its analysis; at worst it is simply an 
unsupported conclusion." ( R., p. 19-20 ). 
If one considers the conclusion to the facts stated in the Record (p. 19-20) by the 
Commission in regards to Dr. Frizzell' s expert medical testimony-it is obvious they are abusing 
their discretion in regards to the facts presented and are making erroneous conclusions. 
Dr. Frizzell did make a "well reasoned analysis that connects the Claimant's accident" 
(May 1, 2006-tripped and fell forward with her left leg flexed underneath her) to a "specific 
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injury"(she subsequently has developed significant left-sided low back pain and left leg pain) 
and this "specific injury to her pain." He also stated that in regards to her past medical history 
there are ·'no significant lumbar injuries or left lumbar pain with leg radiation"; therefore, 
justifying his recommendation in light of the Claimant's history." (Cl.Ex. Fl Dr. Frizzell, 
07131/2008. p. 1-4). 
The Claimant again respectfully contends that this is an erroneous conclusion to the facts 
submitted. Dr. Frizzell stated that he had the opportunity to take a history, examine, review the 
records and reviewed the imaging studies on Ms. LuAnn Shubert. He further states that in 
regards to past medical history ... to my understanding no significant lumbar injuries or left 
lumbar pain with leg radiation. Dr. Frizzell opined that it is my medical opinion, on a more 
probable than not basis, that Ms. Shubert's ongoing left-sided low back, left hip, and left leg 
symptoms are related to her fall on May 1, 2006." He further opined that "I do not believe that 
Ms. Shubert is at maximum medical improvement at this time." (Cl. Ex. Fl Dr. Frizzzelll 
07131/2008, p.1-4). Again this medical expert's statement was made after Dr. Greenwald felt the 
Claimant was MMI. 
The Court has stated that "no magic" words are necessary when a physician plainly and 
unequivocally conveys his or her conviction that events are causally related." Paulson v. Idaho 
Forest Industries, Inc., 99 Idaho 896,901,591 P.2d 143, 148 (1979). 
The Claimant has proven with both substantial and competent evidence that some of her 
medical treatment after her post-MMI date was casually related to her industrial accident and that 
she is entitled to ongoing medical care that is causally related to her work-related injury. Hughes 
v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 48 P3d 1238 (2002). 
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This Court has also held that the referee "must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted 
testimony of a credible witness, unless this testimony is inherently improbable or rendered so by 
facts and circumstances at the hearing or trial." Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 
447, 72 P 2d 171, 175 (1937). 
Referee Powers at the hearing excluded written witness testimonies from Inga Shubert 
and Terry Wood as "heresy" because there's no way for anybody to cross-examine him or her 
unless they're here present at the hearing. ( Tr., p. 14, L .2-25/ p.15, L. 1-5). 
The referee or the Commission cannot just 'take notice of whatever it likes' ----the Court 
affirms that "witnesses are still necessary." Pomerinke, 124 Idaho at 306, 859 P .2d at 342: Hite, 
96 Idaho at 72,524 P .2d at 533. 
These testimonies in the Claimant's Exhibit E were augmented into the Agency Record 
through an Objection to Records by the Claimant ( R., page 54 ). The Claimant would like to 
again confirm that the role of the referee is one of finder of fact. Idaho Const. Art. V section 9. 
These witness testimonies regarding the Claimant's ongoing medical condition as a 
result of her work-related injury were submitted to give credible and uncontradicted evidence in 
support of her legal right for ongoing medical care that is causally related to her work-related 
injury. 
Respectfully consider Judge Molleur/ Administrative Law Judge's impartial opinion 
regarding these testimonies when he asserts "the testimonies of Inga Shubert, Rick Shubert, and 
Terry Wood-although not medically trained, these statements provide insight into the severity 
of the Claimant's impairments and how those impairments affect the Claimant's ability to 
function--as such the undersigned accords great weight to these statements." ( CL Ex. D, p. 4-6 ). 
Per Inga Shubert ... "She (Claimant) use to be cheerful and outgoing, but now she is 
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consumed by pain. She is so controlled by her pain, but she is not one to whine and complain 
publically, but instead suffers in silence. This injury has physically and emotionally taken her 
life." ( CL Ex. E /Inga Shubert). Or consider Terry Wood's written testimony where she states 
"I have known LuAnn all her life and this has changed her whole life. In the last three years 
because of her back pain she hurts and is in pain 24 hrs per day. It is not the LuAnn she once was 
... now all you see is pain." ( CL Ex. E / Terry \Vood ). Or respectfully consider yet another 
testimony that of Rick Shubert who has been married to the Claimant for almost forty years this 
year. He stated, "She is unable to work because of the present pain she is going thrn because of 
this accident ... believe me-we would like to have our life back! This is affecting every area of 
her life and our life together. She can only walk short distances, needs to lay down a lot, 
continual pain, loss of income, etc. We are currently trying to survive-this is not how we want 
to live." ( CL Ex. E/Rick Shubert). These written testimonies were given after Dr. Greenwald 
stated the Claimant was MMI on November 21, 2007. 
If for some lawful reason Referee Powers can exclude as "heresy" the written 
testimonies submitted before this Court, then respectfully consider the sworn testimony of the 
Claimant's husband-Rick Shubert at the hearing. ( Tr., p. 51, L.1-25/ p. 52, L. 1-25/ p. 53, L. 1-
25 ). Per Mr. Shubert' s sworn testimony there is again additional substantial and competent 
evidence presented to support the Claimant's contention that she was never at MMI status and 
that she should be entitled to ongoing medical care. This is credible testimony from the 
Claimant's husband--someone who actually testified under oath regarding the daily life style of 
the Claimant. This attests to the facts of how her ongoing pain and impairments from this work-
related injury have impacted her life on a day-by-day basis. This witness testimony should be 
regarded with significant weight because of the fact that the Claimant's husband can trnthfull y 
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verify as to the impact the ongoing pain and impairments are having on the Claimants daily life 
and her need for ongoing medical care for this work-related injury. 
Again the Claimant refers to the "substantial and competent evidence" standard. Idaho 
Const. Art. V, Section 9; Excell Construstion, Inc., v. State Department of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 
116 P3d 18, (Idaho App, 2005). Whetherthis standard is met is determined ' if facts are such that 
a reasonable mind might accept them in support of the offered conclusion.' Uhl v. Ballard Metal 
Products, 138 Idaho 653, 67 P 3d 1265 authority (Id). The Claimant respectfully believes that a 
reasonable mind after reviewing the facts from the medical experts and personal witnesses would 
find that she is entitled to ongoing medical benefits that are causally related to her work-related 
injury after Dr. Greenwald's proposed MMI date of November 21, 2007. 
The Claimant would also like the Court to respectfully consider the following erroneous 
conclusion to the facts by the Commission. In the Order Denying Reconsideration, the 
Commission states that "as to the Claimant's request for additional medical care, the record 
supports that the Client did not benefit from additional treatment, and that 'none' of her treating 
physicians referred her for additional treatment post MMI date." ( R., p.39, top par). 
Let it be respectfully noted per the evidence submitted by the Claimant that she was 
examined by Dr. Schwartsman on June 26, 2008 and he recommended Ms. Shubert see a spine 
surgeon. Upon that recommendation, the Claimant met with Dr. Frizzell, a neurosurgeon who 
had the opportunity to take a history, examine, review the records, and review the imaging 
studies on Ms. LuAnn Shubert. Dr. Frizzell ref erred the Claimant to Dr. Sandra Thompson for a 
possible spine stimulator trial. Ms. Shubert upon that recommendation met with Dr. Thompson 
and had the spine stimulator trial surgery done. ( LC. Cl. Opening Brief/ p.5-6 ). This was a 
direct referral from Dr. Frizzell. ( Tr., p.47, L. 1-25 ). 
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In the Commission's Order Denying Reconsideration, they also assert that "as to the 
Claimant's request for additional medical care, the record supported that the Claimant did not 
benefit from additional treatment, and that none of her treating physicians referred her for 
additional treatment post-MMI date. The Claimant 'did not present any evidence from any 
expert' regarding disability in excess of impairment." ( R., p. 38-39 ).The Claimant has already 
given substantial expert medical evidence regarding her disability in excess of impairment by 
Judge Molleur. (Cl. Ex. D, p.l). 
The Commission again erroneously asserts that although Dr. Frizzell proposed yet more 
testing, "we find, on balance, that Dr. Greenwald correctly found that further treatment/testing 
would not be efficacious." ( R., p. 40/ middle para. ) 
Dr. Greenwald stated in her clinic report on 03/12/2007 that she (Ms. Shubert) had a fall 
landing on her left knee and continues to have left leg symptoms with annular tear on MRI ... 
"the overall outlook will hopefully be that with an annular tear she will get full recovery with no 
permanent impairment. It is just a very slow go at this point." ( Def. Ex. G. p. 76). 
It is legally imperative to review Dr.Greenwald's clinic reports regarding the 
Commission's conclusions to verify whether their conclusions are supported by the facts. On 
11/01/2007 Dr. Greenwald further stated she (Claimant) has left leg symptoms on MRI and L5-
S 1 small central disc protrnsion ... at L4-5 there is a mild broad disk bulge with no significant 
impingement syndrome. Dr. Greenwald acknowledged the Claimant's annular tear issue in her 
clinical report. (Def.Ex. G, p.77 ). There is 'no mention that further testing would not be 
beneficial.' 
Dr. Greenwald in her final clinical report on November 21, 2007 when she felt Ms. 
Shubert was at MMI further stated that she does fulfill the criteria for an AMA Guide to 
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Evaluation of Permanent Impairment ... because she has difficulty with her activities of daily 
living. Work-she (Claimant) states it is very painful at the end of the day. (Def.Ex. G., p. 85-
86 ). Dr. Greenwald does not state that further treatment or testing would not be beneficial. 
"Rehashing the evidence" is again not the issue-rather the Claimant is contending by 
these cited examples that the Commission again made "erroneous conclusions" in regards to the 
evidence submitted. It is clearly evident from the evidence submitted by the Claimant that her 
treating physicians did refer her for additional treatment post MMI date and that she did have 
ongoing medical complications from her work-related injury. Again recalling the Courts 
decision in Blayney v. City of Boise, 110 Idaho 302, 715 P 2d 972 (1986)--if the Commission 
does not make a correct and proper application of the law in regards to the evidence on record, 
this Court can overturn the erroneous conclusion. 
In regards to the statement by the Commission that the Claimant did not benefit from 
additional treatment, the Claimant would like to cite Idaho Code 72-423: Permanent disability 
results when the actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent 
"because of permanent impairment and 'no fundamental or marked change in the future' can be 
reasonably expected." The Claimant was given an impairment rating because of her work-related 
lllJUry. 
However, to contend with the Commissions assertion that she did not 'benefit from 
additional treatment' the Claimant respectfully asserts that on March 29, 20011 Judge Molleur 
determined that she was "disabled' as a result of her work-related injury. 
How can the Commission contend that she did not "benefit from additional treatment" 
when she is permanently disabled? The definition of permanent disability in this Idaho Code 
describes a condition of the injured person that 'no fundamental or marked change in the future 
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can be reasonably expected.' The Claimant asserts that the Commission legally erred in their 
conclusions in regards to this substantial evidence and that she should be entitled to ongoing 
medical benefits that are causally related to her industrial injury because she is disabled. 
The Court stated that should an employer or surety deny benefits, (Idaho Code 72-432) 
(1) it can still mandate later compensation if treatment is necessary, reasonable, and related to the 
industrial accident. Reese v. V-1 Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630,634, 115 P.3d 721, 725 (2005). In 
Troutner, 97 Idaho at 528, 527 Pat .2d 133, the surety can be liable despite the initial refusal to 
authorize treatment. The Claimant's personal-out-of-pocket medical expenses, insurance co-
pays, transportation costs for medical treatment, prescriptions, and ongoing medical care etc., 
related to this work-related injury (post-MMI date) should all be reimbursed. The Claimant 'was 
injured at work.' An employee's employer and surety are "liable for medical expenses incurred 
as a result of an 'injury' (i.e. an employment related accident). Idaho Code 72-432 (1); Sweeney 
v. Great West Transp. 110 Idaho 67, 71, 714, P.2d 36, 40, (1986). 
Per the Court if the findings of the Commission are not supported by "substantial, 
competent evidence, they are not binding or conclusive ... " Dean v. Dravo Corp., 97 Idaho 158, 
161,540 P.2d 1337, 1340 Z(1975). This Court further states "substantial and competent evidence 
is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Eacret v. 
Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 735, 40 P.3d 91, 93 (2002). It is contended that the 
Claimant has met this evidence standard to support her appeal. 
The Defendant's have "one doctor" (Dr. Greenwald) who stated the Claimant was MMI. 
The Claimant has provided substantial and competent medical testimony that supports her claim 
for ongoing medical benefits because of her work-related injury to a reasonable degree of 
medical probability. Langley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 
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P.2d 732 (1995). The Court defines "probable' as having more evidence for than against." 
Fisher v. Bunker Hill Company, 96 Idaho 341, 344, 528 P.2d 903, 906 (1974). The Claimant 
contends that she has submitted "substantially more evidence to support her appeal than there is 
against it." 
Let it be respectfully asserted that the Claimant has provided substantial and competent 
evidence from numerous medical experts, an administrative law judge, a vocational expert, and 
personal witnesses that attest that her ongoing medical condition is causally related to her work-
related injury. The Claimant contends that she is legally entitled to ongoing medical care (post 
MMI date) that is causally related to her work-related injury. 
III. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abuse of their discretion 
when they did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the 
evidence submitted when they denied the Claimant total and partial temporary 
disability benefits 
The Claimant is contending that she has been in a period of recovery since her work-
related injury on May 1, 2006 up to November 25, 2008-- the date when Judge Molleur opined 
that she was disabled as a result of her work-related injury. (Cl.Ex. D, p. 1). Pursuant to Idaho 
Code 72-408, "Income benefits for total and partial disability during the period of recovery, and 
thereafter in cases of total and permanent disability, shall be paid to the disabled employee." 
The Claimant has provided substantial and competent proof by medical experts that attest 
to the fact that she has not recovered from this work-related injury after the post-MMI date and 
that she was in a period ofrecovery until she was found to be disabled from her work-related 
injury. The Claimant asserts that the Commission has abused their discretion by drawing an 
erroneous conclusion from the evidence provided. Hughes v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 
48 P3d 1238 (2002). 
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The expert opinions presented by the Claimant meet the credibility standard because they 
have considered all the relevant facts. Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 735, 40 
P.3d 91, 93 (2002). This Court addresses the medical testimony issue where the Claimant must 
"provide medical testimony that supports a claim for compensation to a reasonable degree of 
medical probability." Langley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 
P.2d 732 (1995). This Court defines "probable as having more evidence for than against." Fisher 
v. Bunker Hill Company., 96 Idaho 341,344,528 P.2d 903, 906 (1974). The Claimant 
respectfully contends that she has met this required 'probability standard' as required by the 
Court to have her appeal granted. 
The Claimant is contending that she is legally entitled to additional partial and 
total permanent disability benefits post-MMI date because she has never recovered from the 
work-related injury on May 1, 2006. If the Claimant has not reached MMI by a certain date as 
shown by substantial evidence then the Claimant is entitled to benefits. 
Per this Court medical care is compensable if it is due to the industrial accident. 
Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho at 565, 130 P.3d 1097, 1103 (2006). Should an 
employee deny benefits, LC. 72-432(1) the Court can still mandate later compensation if the 
treatment was necessary, reasonable, and related to the industrial accident. Reese v. V-1 Oil Co., 
141 Idaho 630,634, 115 P.3d 721, 725 (2005) (LC. 72-432(1). 
Referee Power's in his Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation stated 
in response to the Claimant's request for income benefits that "none of the records submitted 
were sufficient to challenge Dr. Greenwald's determination that the Claimant had reached a point 
of medical stability." (R., p. 20-21). However, let it be noted to the Court that the Claimant 
submitted Exhibit D giving medical expert evidence by an administrative law judge who did 
29 
opine that she was disabled and not in an MMI status. ( Tr., p. 14, L. 9-12 ). Therefore. Referee 
Power's conclusion to the facts is respectfully challenged as erroneous and should be overturned. 
The Defendant's in their LC. Response Brief when replying to the Claimant's requested 
entitlement for Time Loss Benefits state that none of them opined she was in a period of 
recovery, took her off work, or offered additional restrictions. There is no medical evidence 
supporting the Claimant's contention she is entitled to TTD's.'' (LC.Def. Resp. Brief., p. 16-
17). 
In regards to these erroneous statements, let it be recalled to this Court the following 
"facts" regarding the Claimant's ongoing medical condition post-MMI date: 
The Claimant was pronounced disabled by an expert administrative law judge--
Judge Molleur" stated that the medical record further supports the claimant's allegation 
of disabling impairments; he found that the Claimant cannot perform work activity at a 
medium level of physical exertion; a vocational expert testified under oath that the 
Claimant's past relevant work exceed her residual functional capacity; finally the 
testimonies of Inga Shubert, Rick Shubert, and Terry Wood-although not medically 
trained, these statements provide insight into the severity of the Claimant's impairments 
and how those impairments affect the Claimant's ability to function ... as such the 
undersigned accords great weight to these statements." (Cl.Ex .D, p. 4-6 ). 
Let it also be respectfully noted that on June 11, 2009 ( after the proposed MMI date) Dr. 
Casper opined that the Claimant should not life or carry more than 25lbs ( a lifting 
restriction). More significantly, he opined that she would have difficulties in a prolonged 
standing and walking due to her low back pain. (Cl. Ex. D., p.5). 
This Court states if the findings of the Commission are not "supported by substantial 
competent evidence, they are not binding and conclusive" and should be appealed for review. 
Dean v. Dravo Corp., 97 Idaho 158, 161,540 P.2d 1337, 1340.(1975). In such instances, the 
findings of fact will be set aside on appeal. Id. 
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Idaho Code 72-408 provides for income benefits for total and partial disability during an 
injured worker's period of recovery. The Claimant therefore contents that she is entitled to 
income benefits for total and partial disability during her period of recovery. 
IV. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when 
they did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence 
submitted when they failed to conclude that the Claimant should be entitled to 
total permanent disability benefits 
Referee Powers asked the Claimant during the hearing, "Has anybody ever assigned you 
what's called a permanent partial impairment rating?" The Claimant responded, "Nancy 
Greenwald did. She did a five percent for a hip bruise." Referee Powers then cautions the 
Claimant "that in order to get disability you have to have an impairment." ( Tr., p. 6, L. 15-24 ). 
Referee Powers did conclude in Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations 
that the Claimant has proven she suffers permanent disability of 10% inclusive of her permanent 
impairment. (R ., p.23 par. 47 ). 
Permanent disability results when ''the actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful 
activity is reduced or absent because of permanent impairment and no fundamental or marked 
changed in the future can be reasonably expected." (Idaho Code 72-423). Idaho Code 72-430 
defines that the evaluation of permanent disability is an appraisal of the injured employee's 
present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the medical 
factor of impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factor. 
When determining percentages of permanent disabilities, Idaho Code 72-430( 1) states 
that account should be taken of the nature of disablement, the disfigurement if of a kind likely to 
handicap the employee in procuring or holding employment, the cumulative effect of multiple 
injuries, the occupation of the employee, and his or her age at the time of the accident causing 
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the injury, or manifestation of the occupational disease, consideration given to the diminished 
ability of the affected employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable 
geographical area considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee, and 
other factors. 
The test for determining whether the Claimant has suffered permanent disability greater 
than permanent impairment is "whether the physical impairment, taken into conjunction with 
nonmedical factors, has reduced the claimant's capacity for gainful employment." Graybill v. 
Swift & Company, 115 Idaho 293, 294, 766 P.2d 763, 764 (1988). The determination of 
permanent disability is focused on the claimant's ability to engage in gainful activity. Sund v. 
Gambrel, 127, Idaho 3, 7, 896 P.2d 329,333 (1955). Idaho Code 72-425 requires the 
Commission to assess not just the Claimant's present ability to engage in gainful activity, but 
also her probable future ability. 
The Court stated that "in workman's compensation cases the burden is on the Claimant to 
present expert medical opinion evidence of extent and duration of the disability in order to 
recover income benefits from such disability."' Sykes v. C.P. Clare and Company, 100 Idaho 
761,763,605, P.2d 939,941 (1980). 
The Commission asserted that the "Claimant has produced no competing medical opinion 
from which any other assessment could be determined." (R., p. 21, par.43). In contention to this 
erroneous statement the Claimant respectfully calls the Courts attention to the following expert 
testimonies submitted as evidence in her hearing before the Commission. 
The standard of the Court for witness testimony is that in regards to "testimony of a 
witness that neither the trial court nor a jury may arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the 
testimony of a witness unimpeached by any of the modes of know law, if such testimony does 
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not exceed probability." Jeffrev v. Trouse, 100 Mont. 538, 50 P.2d 872, 874). The Court 
states that the mle applicable to "all witnesses, whether parties or interested in the event of an 
action, is that either a board, a court, or a jury must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted 
testimonies of a credible witness." Manley v. Harvey Lumber Co., 174 Minn. 489, 221, N.W. 
913,914. Finally it has been noted by this Court that the "standard of credibility for an expert" is 
did they take into consideration all relevant facts. 
Ann F.Aastum, was an impartial, vocation expert who testified under oath at the 
Claimant's hearing before Administrative Law Judge Molleur on February 10, 2011. Judge 
Molleur states regarding Ms.Aastum's profession opinion: 
"The vocation expert described the Claimant's past relevant work as a sales clerk-
women's apparel, which is a semi-skilled job performed that the light level of physical 
exertion. As the Claimant retains the residual functional capacity for only sedentary 
work, the demands of the Claimant's past relevant work exceed her residual functional 
capacity." ( Cl. Ex. D. p. 3, 5, and 6 ). 
Dr. John Casper, M.D. following his examination of Ms. Shubert (Claimant) on June 11, 
2009, opined that she would have difficulty in prolonged standing or walking due to her low 
back pain." (Cl. Ex. D, p.5). These expert testimonies regarding the Claimant's were both post-
MMI date. 
These assessments from competent expert opinions (both medically and vocationally) 
were offered as substantial evidence by the Claimant. 
Judge John T. Molleur/Administrative Law Judge for the Social Security 
Administration/Office of Disability Adjudication and Review in his decision date March 29, 
2011 stated regarding the Claimant's disability-'fully favorable.' Per his statement, "I carefully 
reviewed the facts of your case and made the enclosed fully favorable decision." ( Ex. D, p.1 ). 
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Judge Molleur also stated his lawful guidelines in determination of the Claimant's 
condition: 
"An impairment or combination of impairments is "severe" within the meaning of 
the regulations if it significantly limits an individual's ability to perform basic work 
activities ... An individual's residual functional capacity is her ability to do physical and 
mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from her impairments .. .If 
the Claimant has the residual functional capacity to do her past relevant work, the 
claimant is not disabled ... the undersigned must determine whether the Claimant is able 
to do any other work considering her residual functional capacity, age, education, and 
work experience. If the Claimant is able to do other work, she is not disabled." (Cl.Ex. 
D, p.2 ). 
He states regarding the Claimant (Ms. Shubert), "The medical record further 
supports the Claimant's allegation of disabling impairments. The Claimant's onset of 
disability was preceded by a work-related injury when she tripped and fell on May 1, 
2006. Since that time, she has complained of radiating pain down the back of her leg. Dr. 
Schwartsman noted that she had annular tears at L4-5, which correlated with the location 
of the Claimant's symptoms ... She has undergone numerous conservative and invasive 
treatment modalities ... unfortunately these treatments have not provided relief. Further, 
in March 2009, she sought a consultation with Dr. Frizzell who opined that she was not a 
surgical candidate." ( Cl. Ex. D, p.4 ). 
Judge Molleur stated further that as required by regulations he had "reviewed and 
evaluated the various opinions included in the medical record." He stated regarding the 
functional capacity evaluation the Claimant underwent on April 6, 2009 that lasted 
approximately 4 hours: 
"Based on the results, the physical therapist opined that the Claimant could 
perform at the medium level of physical exertion. The undersigned rejects these findings 
for a number of reasons. At the hearing, the Claimant testified that she could lie down 
approximately 5 minutes between activities. Such frequent breaks are inconsistent with 
work performed at the medium exertion level. Similarly, regardless of her lifting 
capabilities, the Claimant's noted inability to stand for a sustained period greater than 3-4 
minutes places her in the sedentary category. Finally, while noting a good effort, the 
therapist noted the Claimant displayed increasing dysfunction as testing continued. 
Taking all these factors into considerations, the undersigned finds the conclusion that the 
Claimant can perform work activity at a medium level of physical exertion is not 
supported. As such, the undersigned accords the residual functional capacity no 
evidentiary weight." (Cl.Ex. D. p. 4-5 )Judge Molleur acknowledges that in regards to 
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the personal testimony statements provided by Inga Shubert, Rick Shubert, and Terry 
Wood that he stated, "Although not medically trained, these statements provide insight 
into the severity of the Claimant's impairments and how those impairments affect the 
Claimant's ability to function. As such, the undersigned accords great weight to these 
statements." ( Cl. Ex D. p. 5 ). 
Judge Molleur further states that "based on a residual functional capacity for the full 
range of sedentary work, considering the Claimant's age, education, and work experience, he 
found the Claimant 'disabled.' (Cl.Ex. D. p. 6 ). 
It is important to again note the expert medical opinion of Judge Molleur regarding his 
review of the Claimant's medical records. He asserts that "the State agency medical consultant's 
physical assessments are given little weight because they are inconsistent with the medical 
records." (Cl.Ex. D, p.5 ). This statement is cited to show this Court that the Claimant did offer 
"competing medical opinion" contrary to the Commission's statement. Further, the Claimant 
respectfully contends that the Commission erred in its lawful role as "finder of facts" and that 
their conclusions do not meet the "evidence standard" set by this Court. 
The Claimant asserts that she has offered substantial and competent evidence regarding 
both of these lawful requirements in regards to her future ability to engage in gainful activity as 
affected by her ongoing impairments. The Claimant again refers to this Court's "medical 
probability standard." It is understood that the Claimant must provide medical testimony that 
supports a claim for compensation to "a reasonable degree of medical probability." Langley v. 
State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 P.2d 732 (1995). The Court will 
disturb the Commission's finding of fact on appeal if they are not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Hernandez v. Triple Ell Transport, Inc., 145 Idaho 37, 39, 175 P.3d 199, 
201 (2007). Also, the Commission's conclusions regarding the credibility and weight of 
evidence will be disturbed if they are clearly erroneous." Moore v. Moore, No. 37083, 2011 WL 
310376 (Feb. 2, 2001). The Claimant respectfully contends that she has exceeded by 
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overwhelming evidence the lawful requirements in these aforementioned laws and that the 
Commission's conclusions are erroneous and should be overturned in this appeal. 
The Claimant respectfully believes she has submitted a preponderance of medical and 
personal testimony as evidence that supports her appeal that she should be entitled to total 
permanent disability benefits from the date she was declared 'disabled' by Judge Molleur on 
November 25, 2008. (Cl.Ex. D, p.1). The Claimant respectfully appeals this court for this ruling 
because of the total loss of her earning capacity in the labor market due to her work-related 
injury. Idaho Code 72-430. 
V. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when 
they did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence 
submitted when they concluded that the Claimant was able to enter the labor 
market after her hearing 
The Court states "that access to a labor market is central in demonstrating that a claimant 
is totally and permanently disabled-that among the relevant non-medical factors the 
Commission must consider in determining a disability rating is the diminished ability of the 
afflicted employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable geographical area 
considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee ... " Id. (LC. 72-
430(1). 
Idaho Code 72-425 states "Evaluation of permanent disability is an appraisal of the 
injured employee's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is 
affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors as 
provided in section 72-430, Idaho Code." 
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The Court asserts that it is the claimant's personal and economic circumstances at the 
time of the hearing, not at some earlier time, that are relevant to the disability determination. The 
Court states the word "present" implies that the Commission is to consider the claimant's ability 
to work as of the time evidence is received. There is no "present" opportunity for the 
Commission to make its determination apart from the time of the hearing." Davaz v. Priest River 
Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296. 
In Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation, Referee Powers 
concluded that "the Claimant is denied a sizeable portion of the pre-injury labor market due to 
the permanent limitations caused by her industrial accident coupled with her non-medical 
limitation as discussed ... In light of the fact the Claimant 'can still perform many jobs' for 
which she is best suited, but mindful of that portion of the potential job market from which she is 
excluded by her accident. .. ( R., p. 23, par. 47). 
The Claimant respectfully again recounts the aforementioned submitted evidence to 
support her contention that the Referee Powers failed to consider her substantial and credible 
evidence offered when he determined that she able to work at the time of the hearing November 
13, 2012. The contention is that at the time of the hearing the Claimant's status was "disabled" as 
a result of her work-related injury. 
Judge Molleur further states on March 29, 2011 that "based on a residual functional 
capacity for the full range of sedentary work, considering the Claimant's age, education, and 
work experience, he found the Claimant disabled.' (Cl.Ex. D. p. 6 ). Respectfully note that this 
expert judgment by Judge Molleur regarding the Claimant's disability was made prior to Referee 
Power's Industrial Commission's hearing and that the Claimant had been disabled since 
November 25, 2008. (Cl.Ex. D, p.1). 
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Judge Molleur also acknowledges the personal testimony statements provided by Inga 
Shubert, Rick Shubert, and Terry Wood. He stated, "Although not medically trained, these 
statements provide insight into the severity of the Claimant's impairments and how those 
impairments affect the Claimant's ability to function. As such, the undersigned accords great 
weight to these statements." (Cl.Ex D. p. 5 ). 
Judge Molleur states regarding Ms.Aastum' s profession opinion: 
"The vocation expert described the Claimant's past relevant work as a sales clerk-
women's apparel, which is a semi-skilled job performed at the light level of physical 
exertion. As the Claimant retains the residual functional capacity for only sedentary 
work, the demands of the Claimant's past relevant work exceed her residual functional 
capacity." ( Cl. Ex. D. p. 3, 5, and 6 ). 
Dr. John Casper, M.D. following his examination of Ms. Shubert (Claimant) on June 11, 
2009, opined that she would have difficulty in prolonged standing or walking due to her low 
back pain." (CL Ex. D, p.5). These expert testimonies regarding the Claimant's disability were 
all given after the MMI date. 
At the time of the hearing the Claimant was "disabled" and the evidence she submitted 
contained both substantial and credible expert opinion and uncontradicted personal witness 
testimony regarding her disability. It is contended by the Claimant that the Commission erred in 
regards to the Court's rnling that "it is the claimant's personal and economic circumstances at the 
time of the hearing" that are relevant to the disability determination. The Court states the word 
"present" implies that the Commission is to consider the claimant's ability to work as of the time 
evidence is received. There is no "present" opportunity for the Commission to make its 
determination apart from the time of the hearing." Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 
Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296. 
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The Claimant is again aware that this Court will not set aside any finding of fact 
that are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but that this Court does review 
questions of fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the 
Commission's findings. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P 2d 759, 760 (1996). The 
Court's definition of substantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho State 
Ins. Fund, 128 Idaho 161, 164, 911 P .2d 754, 757 (1996). 
The Claimant respectfully believes that a reasonable mind would find that the evidence 
she has submitted would support her appeal in this matter. 
Per Idaho Code 72-423 "permanent disability results when actual or presumed ability to 
engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent because of permanent impairment and no 
fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected." 
The Claimant respectfully contends that she submitted "substantial and competent" 
evidence at the time of her hearing before Referee Powers that supports her appeal that she is not 
able to work and has lost her wage earning capacity. Therefore, she has lost her access to the 
open labor market due to her disability resulting from her work-related injury on May 1, 2006 
and that at the time of the hearing in contention to the Commissions conclusion-- she was 
'disabled' and unable to gainfully work. 
CONCLUSION 
Obviously the Claimant wishes that this work-related injury on May 1, 2006 would never 
have happened-however the fact is 'it did.' This industrial accident has dramatically changed 
the Claimant's whole life--intense on-going pain; limiting effects of her weakness and inability 
to function in a 'normal lifestyle;' other medical complications; a lifestyle significantly hindered 
39 
and impaired by pain; financial loss because she can no longer work; let alone the loss because 
she can no longer carry on the daily activities that she enjoyed (work, shopping, crafts, family 
activities) the way she did before this work-related injury. Because of this life-changing work-
related injury---the Claimant believes that she legally entitled to: 1) ongoing medical benefits 
that are causally related to her work-related injury; 2) total and partial temporary disability 
benefits from the time of her work related injury up to the date of her disability, 3) total 
permanent disability benefits from her date of disability onward, 4) reimbursement of all of her 
personal out-of-pocket expenses related to her work-related injury after her proposed MMI date; 
5) reimbursement of estimated lost 401K and pension plan benefits after her date of disability. 
The Claimant respectfully appeals to this Court to rule in favor of her appeal because the 
Idaho Industrial Commission's findings are not based on substantial and competent evidence. It 
is respectfully contended that she is legally entitled to the above mentioned benefits and 
reimbursements due to her work-related injury on May 1, 2006 that resulted in her disability. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ___ day of June, 2014 
LuAnn Shubert 
Appellant/ Pro Se 
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